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TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL FRAMEWORK FOR INSURANCE 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
RONEN A VRAHAM, KYLE D. LOGUE & 
DANIEL SCHWARCZt 
*** 
Discrimination in insurance is principally regulated at the state 
level. Surprisingly, there is a great deal of variation across coverage lines 
and policyholder characteristics in how and the extent to which risk 
classification by insurers is limited. Some statutes expressly permit 
insurers to consider certain characteristics, while other characteristics are 
forbidden or limited in various ways. What explains this variation across 
coverage lines and policyholder characteristics? Drawing on a unique, 
hand-collected data-set consisting of the laws regulating insurer risk 
classification in fifty-one U.S. jurisdictions, this Article argues that much of 
the variation in state-level regulation of risk classification can in fact be 
explained by focusing exclusively on three factors: (i) the predictive 
capacity of the characteristic in question; (ii) the extent of the adverse 
selection problem created if the characteristic is restricted; and (iii) the 
extent to which discrimination on the basis of the characteristic is 
considered illicit. The Article concludes by suggesting that this implicit 
conceptual framework, which is embedded in the pattern of general and 
specific insurance anti-discrimination laws that have been enacted by 
states across the country, sheds new light on the nearly-universal state 
prohibition against "unfair discrimination" by insurers. 
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During the last fifty years state and federal laws have prohibited 
numerous types of discrimination. In the case of insurance, however, 
discrimination on the basis of traits such as race, national origin, gender, 
and sexual orientation is not always prohibited. 1 Sometimes such 
discrimination is even expressly permitted by state law, which, at least 
outside of the health insurance domain, is the predominant source of law on 
insurance discrimination.2 With fifty states (plus the District of Columbia) 
all regulating insurance companies, insurance anti-discrimination law 
varies widely. In a previous article, we empirically demonstrated the 
specific contours of this variation, which exists not simply across states, but 
also across lines of insurance and policyholder characteristics. 3 In this 
Article, we attempt to explain why this cross-line and cross-characteristic 
variation occurs. 
This inquiry is motivated by the seemingly puzzling contours of 
state insurance anti-discrimination laws. For instance, why is state 
regulation of discrimination in the automobile and property lines of 
insurance more robust than in the cases of health, life, or disability 
insurance? Why are insurance companies allowed to use gender in health 
insurance underwriting and rating, but not in automobile insurance? Why 
do states (and the federal government) prohibit insurers' use of genetic 
information in health insurance, but hardly regulate the use of such 
information for other lines of insurance? 
At a high level of abstraction, the answer to these and other puzzles 
is simply that laws regulating insurance discrimination represent different 
tradeoffs between the "efficiency" costs of regulation and the "fairness" 
benefits.4 We have little quarrel with this framing of the issue. But it is too 
1 See Ronen Avraham, Kyle Logue & Daniel Schwarcz, Understanding 
Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 95 (201 4) .  
2 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson A ct of 
1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
13 ,  20-26 (1993). 
3 See Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, supra note 1 .  
4 See, e.g. , Kenneth S. Abraham, Ef iciency and Fairness in Insurance Risk 
Classification, 7 1  VA. L. REV. 403 (1985) (discussing the conflict between 
"efficiency-promoting features of insurance classification" and risk-distributional 
fairness and examining the different methods of resolving this conflict); Michael 
Hoy & Michael Ruse, Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets, 8 
RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 2 1 1 ,  2 1 1-12 (2005) ("Economists can contribute to th[e] 
2014 TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL FRAMEWORK 3 
generic to helpfully explain or predict state law, as numerous types of 
efficiency and fairness arguments can be offered in any particular case. As 
we showed in our earlier article, these factors pull in different directions 
and make it hard to predict when and how a state will regulate particular 
forms of discrimination in a given line of insurance.5 
In this Article we narrow our discussion and focus on two 
efficiency considerations and one fairness consideration to understand state 
insurance anti-discrimination laws. The first efficiency consideration 
involves the capacity of a potential trait to predict policyholder losses. 
Irrespective of applicable law, insurers are not likely to discriminate among 
policyholders unless doing so helps them to better predict potentially 
insured losses. The second efficien.cy consideration is adverse selection: 
prohibiting risk classification forces insurers to charge the same premiums 
to individuals who pose different predicted risks.6 This can produce adverse 
selection, as policyholders .who know they cannot be charged more for 
insurance, even if they possess a risky trait, may be more likely to buy 
coverage because they will not pay its full price. 7 Finally, the fairness 
benefit on which we focus is that insurance anti-discrimination laws can 
prohibit carriers from relying on characteristics that are socially suspect, 
thus preventing insurers from exacerbating or trading on inequalities that 
exist outside of the insurance system (loosely characterized here as 
preventing insurers from illicitly discriminating). 
We argue that these three factors, standing alone, can predict much 
of the cross-line and cross-characteristic variation in state insurance anti­
discrimination law. This is very surprising. One would expect that much 
of the variation in state anti-discrimination laws depends on state specific 
circumstances like the preferences of the constituents regarding questions 
of discrimination, the ideology of the legislature, the strength of the 
insurance lobby, and a host of other socio-economic factors that are unique 
debate [about regulating genetic information in insurance markets] . . .  by casting 
the problem as a classic efficiency-equity trade-off . . . .  "). 
5 See A vraham, Logue, & Schwarcz, supra note 1 .  
6 See Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law-A Primer, 19 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 29, 44 (2012). 
7 See Michael Hoy, Risk Classification and Social Welfare, 31 GENEY A 
PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 245, 245 (2006). To be sure, insurers will classify risks 
even without the threat of adverse selection, because competition from other 
carriers will otherwise skim away the good risks. This does not represent a social 
cost, however, unless it causes at least some policyholders to purchase less 
insurance than they would like to purchase at actuarially fair rates. 
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to each state. As we show below, one can abstract from all these factors 
and still have a pretty good understanding of what explains insurance anti­
discrimination laws in the U.S. In particular, we advance the following 
simple three-prong model to understand how state legislatures strike a 
balance between the efficiency and fairness considerations involved in 
insurance discrimination: 
a) The predictive property-State legislatures will be more likely 
to consider regulating (either by prohibiting or permitting) risk 
classification based on a characteristic (like age) if that 
characteristic has predictive value for policyholder risk. 8 
b) The adverse selection property-State legislatures will tend to 
allow risk classification to the extent that limiting such 
discrimination might plausibly trigger substantial adverse 
selection. 
c) The illicit discrimination proper�State legislatures will be 
more inclined to prohibit risk classification based on a 
characteristic (like age) to the extent that doing so would help 
combat (or appear to combat) illicit discrimination. 
These properties must be balanced against each other to determine the 
outcome of state laws. 
Although this Article is principally empirical and descriptive, it has 
important normative implications as well. In particular, the Article helps 
define the nearly-universal state prohibition against "unfair discrimination" 
by insurers. 9 Existing applications of this concept are haphazard and 
inconsistent. Some courts and commentators assume unfair discrimination 
only occurs when insurers discriminate in ways that cannot be justified by 
8 State legislatures therefore tend to not regufate risk classifications when 
insurers have no economic incentives to discriminate because the characteristics 
convey no relevant information for that line of insurance. An example is sexual 
orientation in automobile insurance. 
9 See generally Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair 
Discrimination Dilemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 KY. L.J. 503, 
563 (l 996). According to our data, thirteen states have general statutes forbidding 
"unfair discrimination" or "unfairly discriminatory" rates by insurers in all lines of 
insurance. Those states are: Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, North 
Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. And every state except Iowa, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wisconsin has a statute prohibiting "unfair discrimination" by 
insurers or ''unfairly discriminatory'' rates or both in connection with life insurance 
in particular. 
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actuarial data.10 But others insist that this understanding is too narrow, and 
could be used to justify pricing and underwriting practices that are prima 
facie unfair, such as charging more for life insurance to African­
Americans. JI 
By exposing an implicit conceptual framework that explains 
insurance anti-discrimination laws across varying jurisdictions, this Article 
provides new support for the latter, more robust, understanding of the 
prohibition against unfair discrimination. Because "unfair discrimination" 
is a statutory term that implicitly invokes broadly shared social 
understandings, its meaning should be substantially informed by consistent 
and widely endorsed applications of this concept in insurance law and 
regulation. Our model reveals that such a framework is embedded in the 
pattern of general and specific insurance anti-discrimination laws that have 
been enacted by states across the country. 12 
Building on this framework, a state insurance regulator might, for 
instance, determine that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 
health insurance should be prohibited as "unfair discrimination."13 As we 
suggest below, such a prohibition would likely not generate meaningful 
adverse selection, because the expected cost differentials between 
individuals with different sexual orientations are relatively small. 14 And, 
10 See, e.g., State Dep't of Ins. v. Ins. Serv. Office, 434 So.2d 908, 9 12-13 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Robert H. Jerry, II, The Antitrust Implications of 
Collaborative Standard Setting By Insurers Regarding The Use of Genetic 
Information In Life Insurance Underwriting, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 397, 429-30 
(2003). 1 1 See, e.g., Hartford Accident & lndem. Co. v. Ins. Comm'r, 482 A.2d 542 
(Pa. 1984); Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to be Left to 
the Actuaries, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349, 385 (1986). 
12 To be sure, we do not argue that courts and regulators should use our model 
only because it reflects legislatures' understanding of what unfair discrimination is. 
We believe that the norms embedded in the model have force in and of themselves, 
which justify using them when interpreting "unfair discrimination." At the same 
time, we believe that the fact that these norms also reflect the preferences of states' 
legislatures supports our normative claims. 
13 Indeed, one state, Colorado, has already done exactly this. See Dep't of 
Regulatory Agencies: Div. of lns., Bulletin No. B-4.49, Insurance Unfair Practices 
Act Prohibitions on Discrimination Based Upon Sexual Orientation, available at 
http://www.one-colorado.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/B-4.49. pdf (hereinafter 
Colo. Div. of lns. Bulletin). 
14 See infra Part V. 
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depending on the individual state, such discrimination might well violate 
newly emerging norms of illicit discrimination. 1 5  
Because this Article focuses on cross-line and cross-policyholder 
variations, it omits another important set of explanatory variables: 
differences among states. Part of what explains the overall variation in the 
data almost certainly includes differences in the populations, economies, 
and political and regulatory cultures in the various states and how those 
factors have changed over time. For example, differences in the levels of 
strictness with regard to insurance anti-discrimination laws could be caused 
by, or at least correlated with, differences across states in the views of 
citizens regarding anti-discrimination laws generally. Another cross-state 
explanatory variable might be the strength of the insurance industry in each 
state, since insurers' interests in controlling adverse selection may be better 
represented in states where insurance companies are especially politically 
powerful. Or perhaps the Red State/Blue State divide might provide some 
explanatory power. Such questions will require detailed information 
regarding the history of each state's insurance anti-discrimination laws. In 
this Article, we focus only on cross-line and cross-characteristic variations. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides an overview of 
the adverse selection, illicit discrimination, and predictive properties, 
considering how each factor might be concretely applied to particular 
combinations of coverage lines and policyholder characteristics. Part III 
describes briefly the empirical approach that provides the backbone and 
evidence for this Article. Part IV then reviews various cross-line and cross­
characteristic variations in state insurance laws that are difficult to explain. 
It then applies the model detailed above and in Part II to explain much of 
this variation. Finally, Part V concludes by exploring the potential 
normative implications of our empirical findings. 
II. A GENERAL MODEL FOR INSURANCE ANTI­
DISCRIMINA TION LAWS 
A. INSURERS' USAGE OF POLICYHOLDERS' CHARACTERISTICS 
Laws forbidding the use of a characteristic in underwriting or 
rating may be hard to justify if insurers are not actually discriminating 
15 Norms on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation have, of course, 
been changing rapidly in recent years. See, e.g., U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013). 
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among policyholders on the basis of that characteristic. 16 To some extent, 
though, this depends on why insurers are not using the relevant 
characteristic. 
First, if insurers do not use a rating characteristic because it has no 
apparent predictive value, then the case for legally restrieting the use of this 
characteristic is extremely weak. Insurers are unlikely to ever use a 
characteristic in underwriting or rating if that characteristic has no 
predictive power. Consequently, the only social benefit such a law might 
provide is to articulate a moral commitment to a principle. But such a law 
could produce potentially meaningful social costs in the form of the public 
cost of legislating and the private cost of policing compliance. 17 
Second, the case for regulation may be slightly stronger when the 
reason that carriers do not use a policyholder characteristic is because the 
cost of determining and verifying the characteristic outweighs the benefits 
of a more refined classification scheme. 18 A plausible case can be made for 
laws restricting insurers' usage of such characteristics: even though 
insurers are not currently employing the troubling characteristic in their 
rating or underwriting, this may change as the composition of the 
population or cost of collecting accurate policyholder information changes. 
Legal prohibitions on risk classification can therefore be justified as a 
mechanism for preventing potentially problematic insurer behavior in the 
future. 
16 Evidence suggests that states often do pass coverage mandates that have no 
practical effect because all known insurance plans are consistent with those 
mandates. See Amy Monahan, Fairness Versus Welfare in Health Insurance 
Content Regulation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 39, 193 (2012). 
17 It is a common critique of expressivist theories generally that they provide a 
compelling argument for action only when they happen to coincide with some 
other type of argument, such as an efficiency or distributive fairness-type 
argument. See generally, e.g. , Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000). Compliance costs may exist 
even if insurers are not using the underlying risk characteristic because the carrier 
must expend funds confirming that this is not the case. 
18 See generally Amy Finkelstein & James Porterba, Testing for Asymmetric 
Information Using Unused Observables in Insurance Markets Evidence from the 
UK. Annuity Market (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1 2 1 12, 
2006) (noting that insurers often do not use policyholder characteristics in 
underwriting or rating even though these characteristics have predictive value, and 
offering various potential explanations for this phenomenon). 
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Finally, the case for regulation is relatively strong if insurers are 
refraining from using problematic policyholder characteristics because they 
fear the potential reputational or regulatory consequences of doing so. 19 
There is good evidence that this occurs. For instance, both auto and life 
insurers often do not take into account policyholder occupa_tion, even 
though this characteristic has been shown to predict claims and is relatively 
easy for insurers to determine.20 Similarly, long-term care insurers do not 
generally take into account gender, even though this has a substantial 
impact on claims experiences. 21 Evidence that smaller and newer firms 
have been more willing than established firms to introduce rating 
innovations suggests that this behavior is partially explained by the fear of 
public or regulatory backlash; newer and smaller firms are likely to be less 
deterred by the prospect of reputational or market backlash as a result of 
risk classification innovation. 22 1n these cases, laws explicitly limiting 
insurers' ability to employ the suspect characteristics have the benefit of 
reducing regulatory uncertainty. Of course, a coherent argument can be 
made that regulation in these settings in neither necessary nor wise: when 
norms and reputation are sufficient to constrain private behavior, it may be 
best for law to avoid intervention because of the risk that it may "crowd 
out" those norms.23 
B. ADVERSE SELECTION 
Adverse selection is a familiar potential efficiency cost of legal 
restrictions on insurers' risk-classification practices. Indeed, some 
commentators label adverse selection resulting from legal restrictions on 
19 See id. at 23-24. Finkelstein and Porterba note a fourth potential 
. explanation: that the predictive content of characteristics such as place of residence 
may be limited by the extent to which such characteristics are subject to change in 
response to characteristic-based pricing differentials. As they note, however, this is 
unlikely to be a substantial factor in most cases because the difficulty of changing 
the underlying characteristic will generally be larger than the potential insurance 
benefits of doing so. Id. at 1 5-18. 
20 E.g., Finkelstein & Porterba, supra note 18. 
2 1 Jeffrey Brown & Amy Finkelstein, The Private Market for Long-Term Care 
Insurance In The United States: A Review of the Evidence, 76 J. RISK & INS. 5, 13 
(2009). 
22 E.g. , Finkelstein & Porterba, supra note 18, at 24. 
23 Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 
(2000); Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 8 1  B.U. L. REV. 553, 568-7 1 (2001). 
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insurers' risk classification practices as "regulatory adverse selection. "24 
Such regulatory adverse selection stems from the fact that legal restrictions 
on insurers' risk classification practices force insurers to charge the same 
premiums to high-risk policyholders who possess the trait and low-risk 
policyholders who do not. This, in turn, can cause high-risk policyholders 
who cannot be charged more for insurance even though they possess a 
risky trait to be more likely to buy coverage because they will not pay its 
full price.25 If this occurs, then insurers may respond by charging low-risk 
individuals premiums that are too high for their risk. Responding to this 
sort of inaccuracy in pricing, low-risk individuals may exit the risk pool 
and opt not to purchase insurance coverage at all, or to purchase reduced 
amounts of insurance. The resulting risk pool will then be comprised of 
predominantly higher risk (and more expensive) insureds.26 
Increasingly substantial empirical research demonstrates that this 
threat is more contingent on the characteristics of particular insurance 
markets than has traditionally been assumed.27 Some insurance markets are 
quite susceptible to adverse selection, while others are resistant to adverse 
selection even if regulations substantially limit the capacity of insurers to 
24 E.g. , Hoy & Ruse, supra note 4, at 245; see also Keith J. Crocker & Arthur 
Snow, The Theory of Risk Classification, in THE HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 245-
74 (Georges Dionne ed., 2000). 
25 To be sure, insurers will classify risks even without the threat of adverse 
selection, because competition from other carriers will otherwise skim away the 
good risks. This does not represent a social cost, however, unless it causes at least 
some policyholders to purchase less insurance than they would like to purchase at 
actuarially fair rates. 
26 The best example of this type of adverse selection death spiral involves 
Harvard University's offer to employees of a generous PPO plan and a less 
generous HMO plan. Riskier employees adversely selected into the more generous 
plan, resulting in a classic death spiral. See David M. Cutler & Richard J. 
Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, in FRONTIERS IN HEALTH 
POLICY RESEARCH 1 -14 (Alan M. Garber ed., 1 998). 
27 Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An. Exaggerated 
Threat, 1 1 3 YALE L.J. 1 223, 1224 (2004) (showing that such death spirals are quite 
rare and that, in many cases, adverse selection is itself uncommon). In a recent 
update and extension of this Article, Siegelman and Cohen find more mixed 
evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets, concluding that the 
phenomenon varies substantially across different lines of insurance and even 
within particular insurance lines. Alma C<?hen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for 
Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets, 77 J. RISK & INS. 39, 77 (2010). 
1 0  CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 2 1 . 1  
classify risks. 28 Unfortunately, the empirical literature does not provide 
precise guidelines about when insurance markets are more or less 
vulnerable to adverse selection.29 Moreover, virtually none of this literature 
examines the susceptibility of specific insurance markets to regulatory 
adverse selection. Instead, virtually all of this literature examines the 
susceptibility of particular insurance markets to adverse selection given 
constant levels of regulation. 
Despite these limitations in the empirical literature, at least eight 
factors seem likely to be relevant to determining if a particular risk­
classification restriction creates a real danger of adverse selection in a 
particular line of coverage. First, rules limiting insurers' ability to classify 
risks are less likely to generate adverse selection when the percentage of 
high-risk individuals is small relative to the population of potential 
insureds. 30 In such cases, compelling insurers not to discriminate against 
high-risk individuals will result in only a small increase in actuarially-fair 
pooled premiums, as the characteristics of all policyholders will, on the 
aggregate, be quite similar to the characteristics of the low-risk 
policyholders. As such, low-risk individuals will be unlikely to opt out of 
the insurance pool because the value they derive from complete coverage is 
larger than this minimally increased cost. Nor will rival firms attempt to 
appeal to low-risk individuals by offering incomplete insurance coverage 
because they can anticipate that such efforts will ultimately prove 
unprofitable.31 Notably, the effect of regulation may be even smaller than 
28 See generally Seth J. Chandler, VisualizingAdverse Selection: An Economic 
Approach to the Law of Insurance Underwriting, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 435 (2002) 
(using computer modeling to show the extent to which adverse selection depends 
on numerous factors in the underlying insurance market). 
29 See Cohen & Siegelman, supra note 27, at 40. 
30 See Hoy, supra note 7, at 249--69;  see also Chandler, supra note 2 8, at 498 
(making similar point by noting that homogeneity of risks in the underlying pool 
decreases the prospect of adverse selection, whereas heterogeneity increases this 
risk). 
31 This result is predicted by the Wilson Foresight model. In the classic 
Rothschild-Stiglitz model, there is actually no equilibrium when the number of 
high-risk individuals is sufficiently low, because firms in that model do not exhibit 
foresight about future risks. They consequently attempt to generate a separating 
equilibrium in a manner that ultimately proves unprofitable. Anticipating this 
result, carriers in the Wilson Foresight model do not attempt to disrupt the pooling 
equilibrium. See Charles Wilson, A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete 
Information, 16 J. ECON. THEORY 167 (19 77). 
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this analysis suggests, as, even in the absence of regulation, insurers may 
not be inclined to discriminate against a small number of high-risk 
individuals because the costs of doing so may outweigh the benefits. 32 
Second, adverse selection is less likely to result from restrictions 
on risk classification when the expected costs of policyholders possessing 
that forbidden characteristic are only slightly higher than the expected costs 
of other policyholders.33 For instance, if men are only 1 % more likely to be 
in car accidents than women, then legal restrictions on the capacity of auto 
insurers to discriminate on the basis of gender will be unlikely to generate 
substantial adverse selection. The explanation for this effect is the same as 
above: the impact of such laws on. the premiums charged to "low-risks" 
will be limited. Consequently, relatively few low-risks will drop coverage 
and the impact of those that do will be minimal. 34 
Third, risk-classification regulation is not likely to produce adverse 
selection when the purchase of minimum insurance policies is legally 
mandated.35 In these settings, low-risk individuals are legally compelled to 
remain within the insurance pool and cross-subsidize high-risk individuals. 
Prominent examples of laws requiring individuals to purchase insurance 
include automobile liability insurance and health insurance under the 
Affordable Care Act.36 An important caveat here is that adverse selection 
32 See infra Part IV.B.7. 
33 See generally Hoy & Ruse, supra note 4 (arguing that a ban on the use of 
genetic testing for the purpose of generating rates would result in minimal adverse 
selection costs). 
34 When the use of the characteristic has only minimal effects, of course, 
insurers are less likely to use the characteristic in the first place, which means that 
the benefits of risk-classification restrictions are likely to be low. 
35 Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and 
Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 380 (2003). 
36 The "individual mandate" in the Affordable Care Act, requires most 
individuals to purchase "minimum essential coverage" or to pay a fine. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18091 (2012) (originally enacted as Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 150l (a), 124 Stat. 119, 907 (2010)); 26 U.S.C. § 5000A 
(2012). However, using an individual mandate or similar tool to combat adverse 
selection poses several complications. Such a system must be designed to police 
the minimum coverage floor effectively so that carriers cannot "classify by design" 
by offering stripped-down coverage to low-risk policyholders. It also must 
preclude carriers from classifying by design in other ways, such as by offering 
additional coverage that affirmatively appeals only to low-risk individuals. E.g., 
Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care 
Reform by Dumping Sick Employees, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 158-62 (2011) 
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can occur even when minimum coverage is mandated, because high-risk 
policyholders may choose to purchase more insurance coverage than is 
legally required. 37 Thus, larger and more comprehensive insurance 
mandates will tend to reduce the risk of adverse selection more than 
minimal insurance mandates. 
Fourth, adverse selection is u nlikely to result from legal restrictions 
imposed on insurers' risk-classification practices when policyholder 
demand for insurance is relatively inelastic. In such cases, policyholders 
will tend not to drop out of the insurance market notwithstanding increases 
in the price of coverage caused by risk-classification regulation. Inelastic 
demand is a general phenomenon that can be attributable to a variety of 
factors. For instance, it is more likely in settings where minimal levels of 
insurance are practically required, as in the case of homeowners insurance, 
which lenders generally require as a condition of a mortgage. 38 
Alternatively, demand may be more inelastic when the cost of insurance 
can be largely passed on to others. Thus, doctor demand for medical 
malpractice insurance may be inelastic if premium costs are principally 
borne by patients and their health insurers. 39 And, of course, inelastic 
demand may simply reflect the fact that individuals are very risk averse.40 
(describing specific strategies by which employers complying with the ACA may 
still be able to "dump" high-risk employees on to insurance exchanges but 
continue to cover low-risk employees). Finally, it must limit the capacity of 
carriers to design their marketing and sales strategies to target presumptively low­
risk individuals. Id. 
37 See generally Pierre-Andre Chiappori et al., Asymmetric Information in 
Insurance: General Testable Implications, 37 RAND J. ECON. 783 (2006) 
(describing positive correlation property of adverse selection, wherein high-risk 
policyholders choose to purchase more insurance than low-risk policyholders). 
38 Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1263, 1320 (2011). 
39 See generally William J. Casazza, Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler: CPAs Liable at 
Common Law to Certain Reasonably Foreseeable Third Parties Who 
Detrimentally Rely on Negligently Audited Financial Statements, 70 CORNELL L. 
REV. 335, 351-52 (1985) (citing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
235 n.4 (2d ed. 1977) (noting that, where demand for CPA malpractice insurance is 
inelastic, the increased cost of the insurance can be passed on to clients)). 
40 See Chandler, supra note 28; see also Mark v. Pauly et al., Price Elasticity 
of Demand for Term Life Insurance and Adverse Selection 30-31 (Nat'l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9925, 2003) (concluding that elasticity of 
demand in term life insurance is generally low, and hence that such insurance is 
generally resistant to adverse selection). One special case of inelastic demand, and 
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Fifth, risk-classification restrictions are less likely to generate 
adverse selection when high-risk policyholders cannot over-insure. 41 In 
some settings, most notably life insurance, insurance coverage is non­
exclusive, meaning that individuals can own multiple different policies and 
the benefits owed under one policy are not impacted by the existence of 
other policies. 42 In these cases, standard requirements that individuals 
insure only up to their economically insurable interest may not effectively 
restrict the capacity of policyholders to enjoy a windfall in the event of a 
loss.43 For this reason, life insurance policyholders can effectively multiply 
the impact of their high-risk status on the pool, resulting in low-risk 
individuals being forced to shoulder a larger burden as a result of risk­
classification restrictions.44 
thus decreased adverse selection risk, may occur in settings where individuals face 
substantial "classification risk." This reflects the prospect that a policyholder's 
future premiums will increase or that coverage will become unavailable as a result 
of insurers' classification efforts. See, e.g., Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Econometric 
Models of Insurance under Asymmetric Information, in HANDBOOK OF 
INSURANCE 365, 365-94 (Georges Dionne ed., 2000). 
41 See Hoy & Ruse, supra note 4, at 222; see Michael Hoy & Mattias Polbom, 
The Value of Genetic Information in the Life Insurance Market, 78 J. PUB. ECON. 
235, 235-52 (2000) ("The fundamental difference between life insurance and other 
insurance policies is, from an institutional point of view, that individuals can buy 
life insurance from as many companies as they want and therefore price-quantity 
contracts are not a feasible means against adverse selection; insurance companies 
can only quote a uniform price for all life insurance contracts. A second important 
difference between life insurance and other insurance is that there is no natural 
choice for the size of loss."). 
42 In most insurance contexts, policies contain coordination of benefits or 
"other insurance" provisions, which prevent a policyholder from recovering under 
multiple policies in a way that would improve the policyholder's financial 
condition as a result of the loss. 
43 At least when policyholders do not face any financial constraints on 
purchasing excess coverage. See Chandler, supra note 28, at 454-55 (noting that 
some insurance is sufficiently expensive that even if policyholders were legally 
entitled to over-insure, many would be unable to do so because of liquidity 
constraints). 
44 Life insurers do have ways of limiting over-insurance of this sort. In their 
applications, they usually ask whether the applicant already has life insurance 
coverage and, if so, how much and with what insurer. Presumably the insurer 
considering the application takes into account the problem of over-insuring, and its 
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Sixth, the risk of adverse selection is smaller when a secondary 
market for insurance policies does not exist, a factor whose importance has 
seemingly escaped attention in the risk-classification literature. In life 
insurance and annuity markets, policyholders can, and frequently do, sell 
their policies to investors via the life settlement market.45 These secondary 
markets may increase the risk of adverse selection by allowing high-risk 
individuals not merely to purchase a policy with an expected net benefit -
the fifth advantage mentioned above - but instead to purchase a policy with 
an immediate guaranteed profit. An individual with a genetic 
predisposition need merely purchase life insurance coverage and then sell 
this coverage to a third-party investor, who will pay some portion of the 
expected recovery to the policyholder in return for becoming the policy 
owner. While individuals have an incentive to hide their genetic defects 
from insurers, they have the opposite incentive when selling policies to 
third-party investors: the sooner the policyholder is to die, the more 
investors will be willing to pay for the policy.46 Not only do secondary 
markets increase the prospect of adverse selection by transforming 
expected values into assured values, they also allow high-risk individuals to 
benefit personally from their life insurance products. Without such 
markets, high-risk individuals could only benefit their heirs by purchasing 
additional insurance, which might limit the adverse selection risk.47 
Seventh, product design can substantially impact the risk of 
adverse selection. In some cases, product design can counteract the risk of 
regulatory adverse selection. One setting where this is possible is when 
policyholders typically learn whether they are high-risk at some point after 
implications for adverse selection and moral hazard when deciding whether to 
issue a policy to such an applicant. 
45 See generally Robert Bloink, Catalysts for Clarification: Modern Twists on 
the Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance, 17 CONN. INS. L.J. 55, 77-
81 (2010). 
46 Risk classification rules that would prevent investors from asking about 
individuals' genetic makeup cannot prevent such transactions because these rules 
would not stop high-risk policyholders from volunteering information about their 
genetic predispositions. 
47 One potentially interesting twist here is that by over-insuring and selling a 
policy to investors, an individual could potentially buy better medical care that 
may eventually save his or her life. J.J. McNabb, Viactical Settlements: Myths and 
Misconceptions, GREATER WORCESTER COMMUNITY FOUND., http://www.pgdc. 
com/pgdc/viatical-settlements-myths-and-misconceptions (last updated May 18, 
2011 ). This possibility may tend to work against the risk of adverse selection. 
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they have the opportunity to purchase coverage, as may occur with health 
status or genetic predispositions (as opposed to race or gender). In these 
cases, policyholders who discover they are low risk can drop coverage, 
leaving behind a disproportionately high-risk pool. Insurers can counteract 
this threat through effective policy design, such as by requiring 
policyholders to pre-pay for future coverage, so that they forfeit these 
payments if they leave the insurance pool once they discover they are low 
risk. 48 In other cases, though, product design can increase the risk of 
regulatory adverse selection. Particularly in life and health insurance 
markets, for instance, insurers cannot cancel an insured's policy once the 
statutorily prescribed incontestability period has run, except for 
extraordinary reasons-such as proof of outright fraud. The same is not 
true of other types of insurance. 49 This fact raises the value to life and 
health insurance applicants of engaging in adverse selection. 
Eighth, regulatory restrictions on risk classification are more likely 
to produce adverse selection to the extent that policyholders both know 
about their own classification status and appreciate its link to risk.50 Where 
these conditions are not met, regulatory restrictions on insurer risk 
classification will not create information asymmetries between 
policyholders and insurers, and thus cannot generate adverse selection. 51 
For instance, regulatory prohibitions on the use of genetic composition will 
not tend to create adverse selection if policyholders are not themselves 
aware of their own genetic composition or fail to appreciate the connection 
between their genetic makeup and their risk levels. 
To be sure, these eight factors are neither exhaustive nor likely to 
be relevant in every case. However, they provide an important set of 
considerations in gauging the risk that restrictions on insurers' risk 
classification practices might generate regulatory adverse selection. 
C. FAIRNESS AND ILLICIT DISCRIMINATION 
48 This is the strategy that level-premium life and disability insurance policies 
take, as they effectively require pre-payment of premiums in the early stages of life 
before many policyholders learn their risk status based on health developments. 
See Baker, supra note 35, at 379-83. 
49 An insurer that sells individually underwritten auto or non-auto liability and 
property policies can cancel policies or decline to renew when the policy comes up 
for renewal. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 696 (2d 
ed. 1996). 
50 See Cohen & Siegelman, supra note 27, at 39. 
51 See id. at 40. 
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Any type of discrimination can be considered illicit to the extent 
that it trades on individual characteristics that are socially suspect. 
Policyholder characteristics can be deemed socially suspect for two related 
reasons.52 First, insurers' use of certain risk characteristics may reinforce or 
perpetuate broader social inequalities by making insurance less available or 
more expensive to historically disadvantaged groups. 53 For instance, 
insurers who charged more to immigrant drivers would thereby perpetuate 
preexisting inequalities. Second, risk-classification schemes may be 
socially suspect because they cause some sort of expressive harm, even 
though they do not penalize with higher rates members of groups who are 
traditionally disadvantaged. As an example, we might object to an insurer 
who announced that it was willing to sell annuities at better rates to 
African-Americans because they tend to have a shorter life span. Unlike 
the first example, this objection might persist even though the traditionally 
disadvantaged group is made better off as a result of the insurer 
classification scheme. Here the problem is not that a traditionally 
disadvantaged group is economically harmed. Instead, the concern is that 
the insurance classification scheme perpetuates inappropriate 
stereotyping. 54 
In many cases, of course, both types of argument can be deployed 
to label a classification scheme illicit or socially suspect. At times, though, 
52 Abraham frames this category more broadly, stating that a classification can 
be suspect for at least four reasons: (i) it is used improperly in other fields, (ii) it is 
not supported by sufficient data, (iii) it systematically works to the disadvantage of 
a particular group, or (iv) it perpetuates unfair disadvantages outside of the 
insurance system. In general, though, none of the first three explanations seem 
problematic unless they are coupled with the fourth. It is not, for instance, 
troubling that classification schemes systematically work to the disadvantage of 
individuals with bad driving records. Similarly, Abraham himself argues elsewhere 
in his article that mere inaccuracy is not, in itself, a basis for a fairness objection. 
See Abraham, supra note 4, at 442. 
53 Although often framed in terms of fairness, this argument can also be 
understood in economic terms as an extemality argument: insurers impose harms 
on society at large by relying on certain suspect classifications. 
54 See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of 
Law: A General Restatement, 1 48 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000) 
("[E]xpressive theories tell actors-whether individuals, associations, or the 
State-to act in ways that express appropriate attitudes toward various substantive 
values."). 
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classification schemes may be socially suspect based only on one of these 
two considerations. For instance, automobile insurance rating schemes 
have recently been criticized because they may result in lower-income 
individuals paying higher rates.55 This objection is principally based on the 
first type of argument: insurers' rating schemes are perpetuating income 
inequality by requiring lower income individuals to pay more for coverage. 
Indeed, it is hard to articulate an expressive harm from insurers' 
underwriting efforts because insurers generally do not explicitly rely on 
policyholder income in rating policies; instead, other classification 
measures may simply have the impact of disproportionately harming low­
income policyholders. By contrast, objections to the use of gender in life 
insurance (but not annuities) may tend to rely exclusively on the second 
type of argument, because gender-based premiums economically benefit 
women, whose expected life span is longer than men. Objections to such 
practices must therefore emphasize the expressive harm associated with 
reaffirming the relevance of gender-based social patterns and practices. 
III. VARIATION IN STATE 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
INSURANCE ANTI-
A. THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH: CODING STATE ANTI­
DISCRIMINATION LAWS56 
To understand state law governing insurance discrimination, we 
investigated how each state (as well as Washington, D.C.) regulates 
insurers' use of nine policyholder characteristics - race, religion, ethnicity, 
gender, age, genetic testing, credit score, sexual orientation, and zip code -
across the five largest lines of insurance - life, health, disability, auto, and 
property/casualty. This produced 2,295 sets of rules (9 traits times 5 lines 
of insurance times 51 jurisdictions), derived from state statutory, 
administrative, and judicial materials. 57 For each state/characteristic/line 
55 Stephen Brobeck & J. Robert Hunter, Lower-Income Hous�holds and the 
Auto Insurance Marketplace: Challenges and Opportunities, CONSUMER FED'N 
OF AM. (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.consumerfed.org/news/450. 
56 This Article includes only a brief discussion of the empirical approach. For 
more details on how data was selected and coded, see A vraham, Logue & 
Schwarcz, supra note I. 
57 Judicial decisions and administrative rulings rarely impacted the coding 
derived from state statutes. Surprisingly, out of the 2,295 trait/line combinations (9 
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combination, we then converted the applicable rules to one of six possible 
codes. These codes range along a continuum, from those that are least 
restrictive of insurers' underwriting decisions to those that are most 
restrictive. The entire continuum is reproduced below:58 
Expressly Permit (-1)-The state has a statute expressly or 
impliedly permitting insurers to take the characteristic into account. 
No Law on Point (0)-The state laws are silent with respect to the 
particular characteristic. 
General Restriction (1)-The state has a statute that generally 
prohibits "unfair discrimination," either across all lines of insurance or in 
some lines of insurance, but that statute does not provide any explanation 
as to what constitutes unfair discrimination and does not identify any 
particular trait for limitation. 
Characteristic-Specific Weak Limitation (2)-The state has a 
statute that limits but does not prohibit the use of a particular characteristic 
in either issuance, renewal, or cancellation. 
Characteristic-Specific Strong Limitation (3)-The state has a 
statute that prohibits the use of a particular characteristic when the policy is 
either issued, renewed, or cancelled, or, the state has a statute that limits, 
but does not completely prohibit, the use of a particular characteristic in 
rate-setting. 
Characteristic-Specific Prohibition ( 4)-The state has a statute 
that expressly prohibits insurers from taking into account a specific 
characteristic in setting rates. 
1. An Overview of Variation m the Intensity of Risk 
Classification Regulation 
The data developed above reveal substantial variations in state 
insurance antidiscrimination laws across the nine characteristics that we 
investigated. This is easily seen in Chart 1, which compares the average 
level of restrictiveness for each characteristic, for all lines of insurance and 
traits times 5 lines of insurance times 51 jurisdictions), only sixteen total trait/line 
combinations were changed on this basis. 
58 We acknowledge that this continuum from permissive to stringent 
restrictions is neither perfectly continuous nor perfectly scaled, but it is the best 
that can be done given the nature of the data. It allows us to "see" the data in a way 
that makes it more accessible. 
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all states combined. 59 Overall, Chart 1 demonstrates that race, national 
origin, and religion are the most heavily regulated of the characteristics. 
Each of these averages more than a weak limitation (a 2 in our coding 
scheme). The next most regulated characteristic is gender, followed by 
sexual orientation. Age is the least restricted, averaging less than a 1 in our 
coding scheme, which means that, on average, state insurance anti­
discrimination laws tend to prohibit unfair discrimination generically, but 
do not specify when or how age-based discrimination might be 
impermissible. 
. 
.. · .. 
Mean SCC)re per Charactertstic 
Chart 1 
State insurance anti-discrimination laws vary not only across 
regulated characteristics, but also across insurance coverage lines. Chart 2 
illustrates this cross-line variation in the intensity of risk-classification 
regulation. It reports the average level of restrictiveness for each line of 
insurance, this time averaging together scores for all policyholder 
59 For example, in Chart 1 the bar for "race" shows the average treatment for 
race across all fifty-one states and all five insurance lines. This is a total of 255 
(51 x 5) laws that are, on average, slightly less than a strong limitation (a "3" on 
our coding scale). 
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characteristics and all states. This value varies between just more than a 
"General Restriction" (or numerical score of 1 )  for disability insurance to 
just more than a Characteristic-Specific "Weak Limitation" (or numerical 
score of 2) for auto and property/casualty. Thus, our data suggest that state 
laws regulating risk-classification practices are most restrictive in the auto 
and property/casualty insurance lines and least restrictive for disability and 
life insurance lines.60 State anti-discrimination laws for health insurance 
fall in between these extremes. 
Mean Score per Line �f Insurance 
outright prohibition 
strong l imitation 
weak l imitation 
general restriction 
no-mention 
permit-'--------------,-----------
prop/cas disability health l ife auto 
Chart 2 
Chart 3, below, reports the restnctlveness of state risk­
classification regulations by characteristic as well as by coverage line. It 
contains the same information as in Chart 2, but with the blue bar 
60 One possible explanation for the restrictiveness of each line of insurance is 
that states with general restriction statutes for a specific line of insurance may not 
have felt a need to pass stricter laws. However, as seen in A vraham, Logue & 
Schwarcz, supra note 1 ,  this was not a relevant factor in explaining cross-line 
variations. 
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"removed" to expose the average scores across states for each 
line/ characteristic combination. 
Mean Score p,er Line & Characteristic 
outright prohibition 
strong liri1itatlon 
perm1t 
Chart 3 
Chart 3 suggests that the similarities in risk-classification 
restrictions in auto and property/casualty insurance extend beyond the 
similar aggregate measures reported in Chart 2. Both lines of insurance 
seem to have a very similar pattern of risk classification restrictions across 
different characteristics, as reflected in the similar patterns of data reported 
in the auto and property/casualty insurance entries in Chart 3.  A similar 
point can be made for health and life insurance, with the exception of 
genetics, age, and gender, which vary significantly in their treatment across 
these two lines of coverage. Disability insurance seems to stand out as 
unique in its pattern ofrisk-classification restrictions. 
Chart 3 also shows that the comparatively heavy regulation of race, 
national origin, and religion noted in Chart 1 exists across all lines of 
insurance. These characteristics (the top three bars) are almost always the 
most intensely restricted characteristics in every coverage line, with 
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sometimes a full one-point difference between them and the next most 
restricted characteristic, namely gender.61  
In addition to adding some nuance to the data reported in Charts 1 
and 2, Chart 3 also reveals interesting disparities in how individual 
policyholder characteristics are treated across different lines of coverage. 
Consider policyholder genetics, for instance. Chart 3 shows that forty­
eight of the fifty-one jurisdictions completely prohibit the use of genetics 
for health insurance, giving genetics the highest overall restrictiveness 
score of any characteristic for a single line of insurance, even though in the 
other four lines the mean score for genetics is low.62 This near-consensus 
among states regarding the use of genetic information in health insurance is 
reflected in the 2008 passage of the federal Genetic Information Non­
Discrimination Act, which forbids the use of genetic information in health 
insurance.63 
Genetics is not the only policyholder characteristic that is regulated 
differently across different lines of insurance. Chart 3 also shows that 
gender is highly restricted in auto, property/casualty, and disability 
insurance, but only weakly restricted in health and is permitted by all states 
in life. 64 Somewhat similarly, Chart 3 shows that credit score is more 
intensely restricted in automobile and property/casualty insurance than in 
disability, health, and life insurance. Finally, age is also regulated quite 
different across different lines of insurance. In health and life insurance, 
age tends towards the "permitted" score, whereas age is regulated much 
more strongly (averaging a weak restriction) in property/casualty and auto 
61 The only exceptions are restrictions on genetic traits in health insurance 
underwriting and restrictions on gender in disability insurance. The "big three" 
phenomenon can also be seen when looking at the number of jurisdictions that 
completely prohibit the use of a characteristic across all five lines of insurance. 
Race (nine states), ethnicity (nine states), and religion (seven states), along with 
sexual orientation (five states) and gender (one state), are the only characteristics 
that were banned in all five lines of insurance by a state. For further information, 
see A vraham, Logue, & Schwarcz, supra note 1. 
62 New York is the only state that allows (with heavy restrictions) insurers to 
use genetic testing in health insurance. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 2615 (McKinney 
2000d. 
3 Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233 
§ 102(b)(l )(B), 122 Stat. 881, 893 (2008). Under the Act genetic testing is defined 
to include family history of disease. 
64 As noted later, federal health care reform prohibited this practice in health 
insurance starting in 2014. 
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insurance.65 These disparities in how individual policyholder characteristics 
are treated across different lines of coverage are explored more extensively 
below, where we attempt to explain them using our model. 
In summary, there are wide variations in state regulation of 
insurers' risk-classification practices. Across policyholder characteristics, 
the most restricted characteristics are race, ethnicity, and religion (the "big 
three"), and the most restrictive combination (outside of the big three) is 
genetics in health insurance. Across insurance lines, automobile insurance 
and property/casualty insurance are similarly regulated, and constitute the 
most restrictive lines of insurance. Health and life insurance are also 
similarly regulated with respect to permissible risk-classification, with 
health being more restrictive. Finally, various individual policyholder 
characteristics, including genetics, gender, credit score, and age, are 
regulated very differently across different lines of coverage. 
IV. EXPLAINING VARIATION OF CHARACTERISTIC/LINE 
COMBINATIONS 
This Part attempts to explain the variations described in Part II by 
reference to the three factors described in Part I. As described at the outset, 
our basic model suggests that state legislatures strike a balance between the 
efficiency and fairness considerations involved in insurance discrimination 
as follows: 
a) The predictive property-State legislatures will be more 
likely to consider regulating (either by prohibiting or permitting) risk­
classification based on a characteristic (such as age) if that characteristic 
has predictive value for policyholder risk. 66 
b) The illicit discrimination property-State legislatures will 
be more inclined to prohibit risk-classification based on a characteristic 
(such as age) to the extent that doing so would help combat (or appear to 
combat) illicit discrimination. 
65 See supra Chart 3. Chart 3 reveals that on average sexual orientation and zip 
code are treated very similarly in all lines of insurance. They almost always fall 
around the score of"general restriction." 
66 State legislatures therefore tend to not regulate risk classifications when 
insurers have no economic incentives to do it because the characteristics convey no 
relevant information for that line of insurance. An example for that is sexual 
orientation in automobile insurance. 
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c) The adverse selection property-State legislatures will 
tend to allow risk classification to the extent that limiting such 
discrimination might plausibly trigger substantial adverse selection. 
These properties must be balanced against each other to determine 
the outcome of state laws. 
Section A of this Part begins with the easiest task: explaining the 
broad patterns of cross-characteristics variation in the intensity of state 
insurance anti-discrimination law described above. Section B then 
attempts to explain the patterns of cross-line variation. Finally, Section C 
uses our proposed model to explain cross-line variations in states' 
treatment of individual policyholder characteristics, including gender, age, 
and genetics. 
A. EXPLAINING CROSS-CHARACTERISTIC VARIATIONS 
The cross-characteristic variation described in Chart I can largely 
be explained by the illicit discrimination prong of our model. First, the fact 
that race, national origin, and religion are the three most restricted 
characteristics is broadly consistent with social judgments that 
discrimination on the basis of these characteristics is socially suspect, as 
reflected in both federal anti-discrimination laws and Supreme Court 
precedent. Thus, federal antidiscrimination laws, like Title VII67 and Title 
VIII, 68 prohibit discrimination because of an individual's "race, color, 
religion . . . or national origin." Similarly, discrimination on the basis of 
race, national origin, and religion has long been subject to strict scrutiny 
under the Supreme Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence.69 
Correspondingly, gender - the next most heavily regulated 
characteristic in state insurance regulation - is subject to similar, though 
slightly less robust, federal anti-discrimination protections than the big 
three. Both Title VII and Title VIII prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
gender to the same extent that they prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
67 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (20 12) (banning employment discrimination). 
68 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (banning discrimination in the sale or rental of 
housing). 
69 Protection from religious discrimination has also been a part of the 
Constitution since our country's founding. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Miller v. 
Johnson, 5 1 5  U.S. 900, 904 ( 1995); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 7 1 1  (4th ed. 201 1 ). 
2014 TOW ARDS A UNNERSAL FRAMEWORK 25 
race, national origin, and religion. But gender only receives an 
intermediate level of scrutiny under the Supreme Court's Equal Protection 
jurisprudence. 70 
The fact that sexual orientation is the next most restricted 
characteristi� after gender is also broadly consistent with emerging norms 
about socially suspect characteristics. To be sure, discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation has not been recognized for protection by federal 
laws in the same way that race, religion, national origin, and gender have 
been. And while the Court has implied a willingness to protect gays and 
lesbians from discrimination, so far it has done so only using rational basis 
review. 7 1 Moreover, gay rights have been enjoying greatly enhanced 
protections at the state level in recent years, with numerous states passing 
new laws in support of gay marriage 72 and prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation in areas like employment. 73 
Age is the least regulated characteristic in state insurance law, 
which is a little harder to understand based solely on the illicit 
discrimination prong of our model. On one hand, discrimination on the 
basis of age is only subject to rational basis review under Equal Protection 
analysis,74 and it is not protected under Title VII or Title VIII. On the other 
hand, though, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act provides 
basically the same protections for age as Title VII does for race, color, 
religion, sex, and national origin.75 
70 United States v. Virginia, 5 1 8  U.S. 5 15, 53 1 (1 996) ("[p]arties who seek to 
defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly 
persuasive justification' for that action."). 
71 Id. at 575. 
72 Jon Cohen, Gay Marriage Support Hits New High in Post-ABC Poll, WASH. 
POST. (Mar. 18, 201 3), http://www. ashingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/ 
03/1 8/gay-marriage-support-hits-new-high-in-post-abc-poll (showing 58% of 
Americans support gay marriage). 
73 See Gay and Lesbian Rights Poll, GALLUP (May 1 1 , 20 14), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/ l 65 1/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx (showing 89% of 
Americans agree that homosexual men and women should have equal job 
opportunities); see also Poll Results: Gay Rights, YouGov (October 3 1 ,  2013 ,  
12:32 PM), https://today. yougov.com/news/201 3/ 10/3 1/poll-results-gay-rights/ 
(showing 69% of Americans believe it is already illegal under federal law to fire 
someone for being homosexual). 
74 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 69, at 802. 
75 See 29 U.S.C § 623 (201 2). 
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The broad patterns of cross-line variation in state insurance anti­
discrimination law can largely be explained by our model, particularly the 
third prong - the adverse selection property. Recall that the auto and 
property/casualty insurance lines are the most heavily restricted by state 
anti-discrimination laws. This is consistent with our conjecture that these 
coverage lines are relatively less susceptible to adverse selection than other 
lines of coverage, giving the state more leeway to prohibit discrimination 
without triggering adverse selection. 
There is good reason to believe that auto and property/casualty 
insurance lines are relatively resistant to adverse selection because 
minimum coverage levels are generally legally or practically mandated in 
these lines. Automobile drivers, of course, are legally required to carry a 
minimum amount of liability insurance in virtually every state. They are 
also frequently required to purchase UIM coverage. When individuals 
finance the purchase of a car, which is quite common, they are also 
commonly required to maintain comprehensive and/or collision coverage. 
Similarly, individuals who finance the purchase of a home, which is almost 
all homeowners, are required by their lenders to maintain minimum levels 
of homeowners insurance. Recall from Part II that when coverage is 
mandated, either de Jure or de facto, the risk of adverse selection is smaller. 
Although this may be less true for liability coverage limits, which tend to 
be relatively low-value, financiers of automobiles and homes generally 
require the purchase of relatively comprehensive insurance. 
Just as the adverse selection property of our model can explain the 
relative strength of state anti-discrimination laws in auto and homeowners 
insurance, it can also explain the relative weakness of these laws in the 
context of life and disability insurance. This is because there is good 
reason to believe that life and disability insurance are comparatively quite 
susceptible to regulatory adverse selection. This point is particularly 
compelling with respect to life insurance for three reasons. 76 First, life 
76 We acknowledge here that the empirical literature on adverse selection in 
insurance markets does not demonstrate that adverse selection is more common in 
life insurance markets that in other insurance markets. See, e.g., John Cawley & 
Tomas Philipson, An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in 
Insurance, 89 AMER. ECON. REV. 827 (1 999); Cohen & Siegelman, supra note 27. 
This, however, is of only limited relevance given that this literature does not focus 
on the risk of regulatory adverse selection. Given the extensive benefits that 
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insurance may be especially susceptible to adverse selection from 
asymmetric information because individuals can relatively easily over­
insure their own lives by purchasing policies from several insurers. 77 
Second, there exists a robust secondary market for life insurance policies, 
allowing high-risk individuals to immediately profit with certainty from the 
purchase and the immediate sale of these policies when regulatory rules 
preclude accurate underwriting. Third, insurers cannot cancel an insureds 
life insurance policy merely because the individual's risk has changed. The 
renewability of a life insurance policy is generally guaranteed for a fixed 
period of time or until the insured dies or decides to drop their coverage. 
Thus, every high-risk insured who makes it into the pool will remain in the 
pool for a relatively long time. 
Adverse selection may also be a problem in the context of 
disability insurance, though this is less clear than in the case of life 
insurance. The peculiar risk of adverse selection in disability insurance 
stems from the fact that, relative to other lines of coverage, disability 
insurance claims occur infrequently, but often involve large payouts. 78 
This means that a small number of high-risk individuals within a disability 
policyholders could enjoy in the life insurance context by taking advantage of 
information asymmetries regarding their risk levels, life insurers go to great 
lengths to limit information asymmetries by engaging in very careful underwriting 
processes. This is presumably an important reason why adverse selection is so 
rarely a substantial problem in life insurance markets. Our point is that, to the 
extent that life insurers were legally restricted from engaging in risk classification 
activities, this would be likely to result in substantial adverse selection because of 
the monetary gains that could thereby be enjoyed by high-risk policyholders. 
77 See Hoy & Polbom, supra note 41, at 236 (2000) ("The fundamental 
difference between life insurance and other insurance policies is, from an 
institutional point of view, that individuals can buy life insurance from as many 
companies as they want and therefore price-quantity contracts are not a feasible 
means against adverse selection; insurance companies can only quote a uniform 
price for all life insurance contracts. A second important difference between life 
insurance and other insurance is that there is no natural choice for the size of 
loss."). On the other hand, when life insurers issue new policies, they require 
applicants to list all other life insurance policies in force on the person whose life is 
being insured. If the amount of combined coverage exceeds a given threshold, the 
life insurer is unlikely to issue the new policy, or will at least insist on a high 
premium, on adverse selection grounds. 
78 The Use of Genetic Information in Disability Income and Long-Term Care 
Insurance, ISSUE BRIEF (Am. Acad. of Actuaries), Spring 2002, at 2, available at 
http://www.actuary.org/pdf7health/ genetic_ 25apr02. pdf 
28 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 2 1 . 1  
insurance pool can substantially skew the prices that low-risk individuals 
pay.79 
Finally, the risk of regulatory adverse selection also seems to 
provide a plausible explanation for the fact that relative strictness of state 
anti-discrimination laws in health insurance fall in between 
property/casualty and auto insurance, on one end, and life and disability 
insurance, on the other. This is because adverse selection concerns with 
respect to the type of discrimination we investigate - which does not 
include health-based discrimination - are quite nuanced in the health 
insurance context. On one hand, none of the special factors applicable to 
life insurance apply to health insurance markets: over-insurance is not 
possible, there are no secondary markets for policies, at least until recently 
insurers could drop high risk insureds, and substantial payouts are made on 
a comparatively large number of policyholders. Additionally, depending 
on state law, health insurance carriers (until very recently) could combat 
adverse selection through product design, for example by asking for 
applicants' medical history.80 Health insurance carriers also enjoy a unique 
ability to sell coverage on a group basis because the tax code confers 
substantial tax benefits on employer-sponsored coverage. 81 Employer-
79 This corresponds to the first adverse selection argument that there are a 
small number of high-risk individuals. 
80 See Jacob Glazer & Thomas G. McGuire, Optimal Risk Adjustment in 
Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care, 90 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1055, 1055, 1057 (2000). The extent to which life and disability insurance 
underwriters also use product design to combat adverse selection is unclear. To the 
extent that they do not request information about one's family history of genetic 
disease, the rationale for this is also unclear. What we do know is that requesting a 
family history of diseases is the norm with individually underwritten health 
insurance policies. 
81 Specifically, federal tax laws allow the full value of employer-provided 
health insurance to be excluded from employees' income for purposes of 
calculating their income tax liability. 26 U.S.C. § 1 06(a) (2012). While life and 
disability insurance are also frequently sold on a group basis, there is less bias 
towards group markets in these contexts, principally because of the absence of 
comparable tax subsidies. Approximately 50% of life insurance policies are sold 
through employers, and approximately 50% are sold through the individual market, 
though policies sold in the individual market tend to be larger. See The Life 
Insurance Coverage Gap: Strategies for Financial Professionals to Close the Gap, 
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL 1 (201 3), http://research.prudential.com/documents/rp/ 
RP_ The_ Life_ Insurance_ Coverage_ Gap. pdf (citing LIMRA, PERSON-LEVEL 
TRENDS IN U.S. LIFE INSURANCE OWNERSHIP (20 1 1 )). A substantial majority of 
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sponsored coverage combats the risk of adverse selection without any 
underwriting because employees are relatively heterogeneous with respect 
to most health-related factors, and definitely with respect to their genetic 
predisposition to illness.82 
The adverse selection prong of our model cannot fully explain the 
treatment of health insurance, as regulatory adverse selection caused by at 
least some of the anti-discrimination rules we isolate is a very real risk in 
health insurance for two reasons. First, and most importantly, the expected 
costs of high-risk policyholders in the context of some anti-discrimination 
rules - particularly age and gender - can be substantially larger than the 
expected costs of low-risk individuals. 83 Second, there are a potentially 
large number of people who constitute high-risk individuals in this 
contex�.84 All of this is consistent with the fact that the Affordable Care Act 
("ACA") limits discrimination on the basis of age and prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of gender. The ACA also contains the 
individual mandate and substantial tax subsidies, both of which were 
specifically designed to limit the risk of adverse selection. 
The middling level of state anti-discrimination law in health 
insurance becomes more understandable, though, when the illicit 
discrimination prong is added back in to the analysis. Concerns about 
illicit discrimination are stronger in health insurance than in any other line 
of coverage, as many view adequate health insurance to be a "right," 
whereas few make similar arguments for other forms of coverage. 85 As 
private health insurance is sold through employers. See David A. Hyman & Mark 
Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL'Y L. & ETHICS 23, 2 6  (200 l ). 
82 See Hyman & Hall, supra note 8 1 ,  at 32-33. 
83 See supra Part II.A (discussing factor two). 
84 See supra Part II.A (discussing factor one). 
85 See William Nowlan, A Rational View of Insurance and Genetic 
Discrimination 297 SCIENCE 195, 195 (2002) ("[A] clear distinction exists between 
economic and ethical considerations involved in underwriting health insurance and 
those that apply to life insurance. Life insurance in this country is not a societal 
right, although everyone is potentially eligible for limited survivorship benefits 
through social security."). But see Susan M. Wolf & Jeffrey P. Kahn, Genetic 
Testing and the Future of Disability Insurance: Ethics, Law & Policy, 35 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 6, 8, 13 (2007) (noting that the difference in the laws may be attributable 
to the difference in "social importance" that people place on health insurance over 
life and disability insurance, but arguing that genetic information should be banned 
from disability insurance as well). 
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such, even if adverse selection concerns were as substantial in health 
insurance as they are in life and disability, thus tending to lead to less state 
anti-discrimination regulation, the illicit discrimination prong would tend to 
push in the opposite direction, promoting stronger anti-discrimination laws. 
The result would be a middling level of protection, precisely what we 
observe. 
c. EXPLAINING PARTICULAR 
CHARACTERISTIC COMB INA TIO NS 
CROSS-LINE/CROSS-
Our model does a relatively good job of explaining the broad 
trends in cross-characteristic variation and cross line variation that we 
observe. In this section, we show that the model also provides relatively 
good explanations for many of the more specific patterns of state 
antidiscrimination law, wherein variation exists in the treatment of 
individual policyholder characteristics across different lines of coverage. 
1 .  Cross-Line Treatment o f  Genetics 
As noted in Part III, and more specifically illustrated in Chart 4 
below, there is tremendous variation in the treatment of genetics across 
policy lines. This variation, moreover, does not follow the more general 
trends in cross-line variation: most notably, health insurance is much more 
strongly regulated than the other lines. In fact, the use of genetic 
information in health insurance underwriting is the most restrictive trait in 
our study. By contrast, Chart 4 shows that there is very little regulation of 
genetics in the other lines of insurance. 86 In fact, many states go so far as to 
explicitly permit the use of genetic information in other lines of insurance 
(a "- 1 "  in our coding scheme). This can be seen in life insurance, and to a 
greater degree in disability insurance, which are regulated similarly with 
respect to genetics. 87 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
86 New York is the only state to permit the use of genetic testing in health 
insurance, making it an outlier. New York is not even consistent, also permitting 
genetic discrimination in life and disability insurance, but restricting the use of 
genetics in auto and property/casualty. 
87 The main visual difference between life and disability insurance in Chart 4 
is that while there are several states which do not mention anything about the usage 
of genetic test in disability insurance (score 0), there are no such states in life 
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("GINA") mirrors this result at the federal level, prohibiting health insurers 
(and employers) from using individuals' genetic information, but leaving 
other forms of insurance unregulated with respect to genetic discrimination. 
Chart 4: Distribution of States' Scores for Genetic Testing, by Insurance 
Line 
Our model doei a relatively good job of explaining these pattems.88 
First, consider the treatment of genetic information in automobile and 
property/casualty insurance, which is usually restricted only under states'  
general restriction laws (coded as  a 1 ) . Observe next that many states do 
not even mention genetic information in their laws, ana that only two states 
expressly permit discrimination based on genetic information. These 
insurance, and more states have the score of 1 (general restriction). That is not a 
major difference. 
88 For other attempts to explain these patterns, see generally Hoy & Polbom, 
supra note 4 1  (discussing the use of genetic testing in life' insmance) and Wolf & 
Kahn, supra note 85 (discussing the use of genetic testing in disability insurance). 
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trends are consistent with prong one of our model, reflecting the fact that 
genetic testing does not (at least yet) seem to provide information that is 
predictive of expected losses with respect to auto and property/casualty 
insurance. As the first prong of our model predicts, legislatures are 
unlikely to act when insurance companies are not using, and are not likely 
to use, a specific characteristic in their underwriting decisions. 
The observed patterns in life and health insurance are also 
consistent with our model. In these domains, where genetics is indeed 
quite predictive of risk, the illicit discrimination prong of our model 
becomes central. Genetic discrimination in the context of health, life, and 
disability insurance immediately evokes Nazi Germany and its obsession 
with promoting the reproduction of more "genetically desired" people and 
eliminating "genetically defective" individuals. Under this worldview, 
Nazis first forced those with Huntington's disease to be sterilized and later 
murdered them in extermination facilities.89 The United States also has a 
history of forced sterilization based on supposed genetic defects. 90 This 
history has led to broad social protections for those with genetic conditions, 
and suggests that in the health, life, and disability insurance domain, 
insurers' use of genetics would raise strong concerns about illicit 
discrimination on the basis of socially suspect categories.91 
At the same time, the adverse selection prong of our model is also 
relevant to assessing prohibitions on insurers' use of genetic information. 
This fact largely explains why genetic discrimination is treated so 
differently in health insurance, on the one hand, and life and disability 
insurance, on the other hand. As was explained in the previous section on 
89 Thomas Lemke, "A Slap in the Face ". An Exploratory Study of Genetic 
Discrimination in Germany, 5 GENOMICS, SOC'Y & POL'Y 22, 29 (2009). 
90 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 1 10-233, § 
2(2), 122 Stat. 88 1 ,  882 (2008). 
91 Standing on their own, illicit discrimination arguments are not persuasive in 
explaining the differential treatment of genetic discrimination in health, on the one 
hand, and life and disability on the other. One might argue that genetic risk should 
be prohibited as a factor for obtaining health insurance based upon the view that 
adequate health insurance is a "right." While this argument may contribute to the 
differences in treatment of genetic information across insurance lines, the fact that 
gender and age are allowed to be taken into account in health insurance (as we 
show below), suggests that the economic impact of adverse selection is a more 
powerful explanation. In fact, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
specifically clarifies that "[t]he term ' genetic information' shall not include 
information about the sex or age ofany individual." Id at § 1 0 l(d)(6)(C). 
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the intensity of regulation, life and disability insurance markets are 
generally more susceptible to adverse selection than health insurance 
markets (at least with respect to the policyholder characteristics we 
studied). As such, while the illicit discrimination prong overwhelms the 
adverse selection prong in health insurance, it is unable to do so in life and 
disability insurance, where the efficiency argument for allowing the use of 
genetic information is stronger. 
This argument is enhanced by the fact that adverse selection 
concerns about genetic information in the health insurance context are 
relatively muted for health insurance policies purchased in individual 
markets. Such policies are often only in force for a short time. Yet genetic 
predisposition to illness represents a long-term, and typically a 
probabilistic, threat. For these reasons health insurers often focus on the 
short-terms risks of their policyholders and may not have an incentive to 
attempt to identify such long-term risks.92 
2. Cross-Line Treatment of Gender 
The most striking result shown in Chart 5 is that every jurisdiction 
in the country expressly permits insurers to take gender into account in life 
insurance. Interestingly, this has not always been the case. Until the mid 
1 980s the picture was quite similar to that of health insurance. In 
particular, twenty-one jurisdictions permitted using gender compared with 
nineteen jurisdictions which strongly limited it and two states, Montana and 
North Carolina, which prohibited it. The remaining nine jurisdictions 
restricted its use. Every jurisdiction had some opinion on how gender 
should be treated, as there were not any "no-law-on-point" entries. In. 1983 
the Supreme Court delivered the famous decision of Arizona Governing 
Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. 
Norris.93 In Norris the Court ruled that employers cannot use gender-based 
retirement tables as this was impermissible in the employment context 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964.94 Because states became 
concerned that similar principles will be applied to privately provided life 
insurance, eventually every jurisdiction made clear that life insurers are 
92 See Nowlan, supra note 85, at 195. 
93 463 U.S. 1073 ( 1983). 
94 Id. at 1074. 
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permitted under state law to use gender-blended or gender-based mortality 
tables, at their discretion.95 
Besides life insurance state laws vary dramatically across coverage 
lines in the extent to which they allow insurers to take into account gender 
in classifying policyholders. 96 This is most vividly demonstrated in the 
domain of health insurance. As Chart 5 reveals, eighteen jurisdictions 
expressly permit the use of gender in health insurance, while twenty-eight 
jurisdictions strongly limit or expressly prohibit its use. Gender is such a 
prominent issue for health insurance that every jurisdiction has addressed it 
in one way or another - either with a general or a specific statute; in other 
words, there are no entries in the "no-law-on-point" column of Chart 5 .  
Interestingly, the Affordable Care Act prohibits insurers from charging 
higher rates due to gender in the individual and small group insurance 
markets.97 
95 See A vraham, Logue & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 244 n. 140. 
96 Recently, the Court of Justice of the European Union banned insurers' use 
of gender in all forms of insurance. See Case C-236/09, Association Beige des 
Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL, Yann van Vugt, Charles Basselier v. Conseil 
des Ministres, 20 1 1  E.C.R. I-800, I-8 1 7  (invalidating Article 5(2) of Council 
Directive 2004/1 13/EC of 1 3  December 2004 as inconsistent with the Directive's 
purpose of combatting gender discrimination in insurance). 
97 Key Features of the Affordable Care Act By Year, U.S.  DEP'T OF HEALTH 
& HUM. SERVS. ,  available at http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/timeline/ 
timeline-text.html (last visited Nov. 1 7, 2014). Irrespective of whether this 
approach is "correct," Chart 5 suggests that the Affordable Care Act can be 
defended on the basis that it establishes a national policy on the issue. Even though 
states generally have autonomy to make their own decisions about various issues, 
the federal government has long played a central role in regulating discrimination 
on the basis of gender. See, e.g. , 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (prohibiting 
employers from discriminating on the basis of sex). 
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Chart 5 :  Distribution of States' Scores for Gender, by Insurance Line 
The use of gender is both less polarized and more restricted in the 
other three lines of insurance. For the property/casualty line, most states 
are on the restrictive side of the chart, with twenty-five strongly limiting its 
use.98 Not surprisingly, state laws display a similar pattern with respect to 
auto insurance. 99 Disability insurance is also restrictive with only 
Washington expressly permitting the use of gender and twenty-six strongly 
limiting it. 
The cross-line variation in the treatment of gender substantially 
matches the more general cross-line variation described in Chart 2. Both 
overall and with gender specifically, auto and property/casualty insurance 
received the most restrictive scores. Similarly, life insurance received the 
lowest score overall with a clean -1 for all states. The only lines for which 
98 Only Maryland expressly permits the use of gender and Kansas has no law 
on point. 
99 Only four states (California, Delaware, Louisiana, and Maryland) permit 
gender's use and twenty-two strongly limit it. 
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gender differed from the average of all nine characteristics were health and 
disability. As seen in Chart 2, health insurance on average is treated more 
restrictively than disability insurance, but with gender the opposite is true -
states are more restrictive with disability insurance and less restrictive with 
health insurance. 
All of this suggests that the broad explanations for cross-line 
variation discussed above - which focus predominantly on adverse 
selection - can also explain the more specific pattern of cross-line variation 
found with respect to gender. Indeed, when looking at gender and life 
insurance, the differences between men and women in mortality risks are 
more important than is often assumed. Although the average difference in 
life expectancy between men and women is only several years, the 
difference in one's chance of dying in a given year varies greatly by 
gender. 100 Indeed, following Norris it was the fear of adverse selection that 
pushed all fifty-one jurisdictions to either issue a regulation or pass a 
statute (or both) in order to make clear that, if the Court were to expand its 
Norris holding to privately provided life insurance, then life insurers would 
have the discretion whether to use gender-blended or gender-based 
mortality tables. 
Similarly, substantial differences exist in the expected healthcare 
costs of men and women due to the costs of child bearing, meaning that 
adverse selection also a substantial risk when gender-based classification is 
prohibited with respect to health insurance.1 01 While troubling on fairness 
grounds, this makes sense because it prevents an individual from waiting 
until she intends to become pregnant before enrolling in an insurance plan. 
If insurers cannot discriminate on the basis of gender they may have to 
charge higher prices to men relative to their (assigned) risk, causing them 
to drop out of the risk pool. 102 This explanation is consistent with the 
100 But see Mary W. Gray & Sana F. Shtasel, Insurers Are Surviving Without 
Sex, 7 1  AB.A. J. 89, 9 1  ( 1985). 
101 One way that insurance companies prevent adverse selection in the 
individual market is by not including coverage for maternity costs. See NAT'L 
WOMEN'S LAW CTR., STILL NOWHERE TO TURN: INSURANCE COMPANIES TREAT 
WOMEN LIKE A PRE-EXISTING CONDITION 3 (2009), available at http://www.nwlc. 
org/sites/default/files/pdfs/stillnowheretoturn.pdf (finding that 87% of health plans 
in the individual market available to a 30-year-old woman do not provide 
maternity coverage). 
1 02 Interestingly, this might have the opposite effect for women with no plans 
to become pregnant. Such women would face an even greater discrepancy between 
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ACA's ban on gender-based underwriting, as the risk of adverse selection 
is largely counteracted by the incorporation of the individual mandate in 
the statute.103 By contrast, adverse selection is not a substantial risk when 
state laws prohibit insurers from using gender in auto or property/casualty 
insurance. In addition to coverage mandates and lender requirements 
(which are explained above), this is because gender does not appear to 
correlate strongly with risk in property/casualty insurance, a fact that both 
limits the practical effect of the law as well as the risk of adverse selection. 
In the automobile insurance context, where gender may arguably play a 
role, the expected differences in risk between men and women, once other 
policyholder characteristics are taken into account, may be relatively small. 
To the extent that the cross line variation for gender does not match 
the broader patterns of cross-line variation described above, they are 
nonetheless consistent with our model. In particular, the fact that health 
insurance is more strongly regulated than disability insurance likely stems 
from the first prong of our model: gender has a clear predictive value in life 
and health insurance, and therefore it is clear why no state has left gender 
unregulated in these lines of insurance. In contrast, it is not clear that 
gender has a predictive value in disability insurance (at least after 
controlling for whether the insured is working and, if so, what industry he 
or she is working in), which may explain why ten states have left it 
unregulated. Prong one in the specific context of gender thus alters the 
usual ordering of health and disability insurance. 
Our model is also consistent with the fact that gender is permitted 
in life insurance. Illicit discrimination arguments against gender-based 
discrimination in the life insurance context are comparatively less 
compelling than in other lines. First, while gender-based discrimination 
increases women's premiums for annuities, it decreases women's 
premiums for life insurance products, so the net actual effect is likely to be 
small and may even be null. 104 Second, the ultimate beneficiaries of life 
insurance products are frequently the spouse or children of the person 
insured, therefore, even if discrimination was prohibited and one gender 
was forced to pay systematically higher premiums than the other gender, it 
is not clear that the incidence of such a premium differential would be 
their true risks and their premiums if insurers charged only women for the expected 
costs of child birth than if they spread this risk among women and men. 
103 See supra Part IL 
104 Most states treat traditional life insurance and annuities similarly in their 
risk classification regulations. 
38 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 2 1 . 1  
borne systematically by one gender or the other. Both of these points mean 
that discrimination does not systematically harm or help women, and thus 
that any fairness-based argument trading on the notion that gender is a 
socially suspect classification category is substantially weakened. 
3 .  Cross-Line Treatment of Age 
States' regulation of age-based classifications also varies 
substantially across insurance lines, as reflected in Chart 6. On one hand, 
state laws are strongly permissive with respect to insurer use of age in life 
and health insurance.105 In life insurance thirty-nine jurisdictions permit its 
use and none specifically limit or prohibit it. In health insurance, thirty-six 
jurisdictions - more than two-thirds - permit the use of age by insurance 
companies, while only eleven strongly limit its use. 106 The ACA limits 
differentials in premiums based on age to no more than a ratio of three to 
one. 107 On the other hand, age is more restricted in auto and 
property/casualty lines of insurance. Most states are on the restrictive side 
of the chart in these lines, with twenty-five having only general unfair 
discrimination rules applying to age. 108 Finally, most jurisdictions do not 
mention age in their disability insurance laws, or only provide a general 
105 Chart 3 showed that age is the only characteristic that, on average, leans 
towards being expressly permitted for any line of coverage. This is true for both 
health insurance and life insurance. 
1 06 Notably, eleven jurisdictions strongly limit the use of age in health 
insurance (California, Idaho, Illinois, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Vermont). 
107 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 1 1 1 - 148, § 
2701 (a)(l )(A)(iii), 1 24 Stat. 1 19, 1 55 (201 0). 
108 In auto insurance, only Delaware, Louisiana, and Michigan permit the use 
of age, five others have no-law-on-point, and the rest are roughly equally 
distributed between the four restrictive categories. Even in jurisdictions that 
expressly prohibit the use of age, younger drivers may pay higher automobile 
insurance premiums if insurers are allowed to rate based on the number of years of 
driving experience while others that have a specific restriction may permit the use 
of age under certain circumstances, like if there is a proven correlation between 
accident rate and the characteristic. Compare CAL. INS. CODE § 1 861.02(a)(3) 
(West 2008) (allowing use of the number of years of driving experience), with 
N.Y. INS. LAW § 233 1 (McKinney 2000) (forbidding the state approval of auto 
insurance plans that consider age, gender, or marital status, "unless such filing is 
supported by and reflective of actuarially sound statistical data."). 
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restriction.109 Overall, disability insurance is another non-restrictive line of 
insurance with the unique fact that most states (twenty-six) do not mention 
anything at all. 
Chart 6: Distribution of States' Scores for Age, by Insurance Line 
Because the patterns of cross-line variation with respect to age 
match the broader patterns of cross line variation; our model can explain 
these findings in the same way that it explains the broader cross-line 
variation described in Part B. But prong three of our model also helps to 
explain the more specific fact that state regulation of age is particularly 
permissive in the context of health and life insurance. Regulatory 
restrictions on the use of age in the context of health and life insurance 
would raise particularly large adverse selection concerns. This is because 
the magnitude of the correlation between age and death/illness is very large 
and very well understood by policyholders. Indeed, the connections 
between age, on the one hand, and the risks of illness and death, on the 
109 No state prohibits the use of age in disability insurance and only three 
states strongly limit it (Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Texas). 
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other, are so intuitive that many deaths and illnesses (such as dehydration) 
are simply attributed to "old age."1 10 
Admittedly, our model does have trouble explaining one element 
of the cross-line regulation of age: the lack of state law specifically 
regulating the use of age in disability insurance. Prong one could explain 
this finding if age had no predictive value in disability insurance. But this 
seems unlikely, although the nature of the connection between age and 
disability is certainly less clear than it is in the context of health, life, and 
auto insurance. 
4. Cross-Line Treatment of Credit Score 
The cross-line treatment of credit score discrimination matches the 
larger trends seen across all characteristics: it is most heavily regulated in 
auto and property/casualty and less heavily regulated in life, health and 
disability. Aside from demonstrating this fact, Chart 7 also shows that 
insurers' use of credit score is specifically addressed by almost every state 
in property/casualty and auto insurance. 1 1 1  By contrast, many state laws 
generally do not specifically address the use of credit score in health, life, 
and disability insurance, where the majority of the laws are coded as either 
a "O" or a " 1 ." Where this is not the case, states explicitly permit the use of 
credit score, and few explicitly restrict it. 
1 10 Spencer Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 1 979 AM. B. 
FOUND. REs. J. 83,  108 (1979) ("Age discrimination is so basic in life insurance 
and annuities that any serious challenge to it seems unlikely."); see also Lea 
Brilmayer et al., Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A 
Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 505 (1980). 
1 1 1  In auto insurance, the only jurisdiction that does not mention credit score is 
the Washington, D.C. 
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Chart 7: Distribution of States' Scores for Credit Score, by Insurance Line 
Once again, these findings are broadly consistent with both general 
trends and our explanations for these general trends. But our model also 
provides some more nuanced explanation for these findings. In particular, 
the fact that credit score is so rarely mentioned in state laws governing 
health, life, and disability, but specifically addressed in auto and 
property/casualty, is quite consistent with prong one of our model, the 
predictive property. Put quite simply, credit score has repeatedly been 
shown to predict losses in property/casualty and auto insurance. 1 12 
1 12  See FED. TRADE COMM'N, CREDIT BASED INSURANCE SCORES: IMPACTS ON 
CONSUMERS OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (2007), available at http://www.ftc. 
gov/os/2007 /07 /P044804F ACT A_ Report_ Credit-Based_ Insurance_ Scores.pdf 
(discussing widespread use of credit scores in auto and homeowners). The reason 
why, however, is not well understood. According to the National Association of 
Independent Insurers, at least, "people who manage their personal finances 
responsibly tend to manage other important aspects of their life with that same 
level of responsibility and that would include being responsible behind the wheel 
of their car or being responsible in maintaining their home." ERIC SIEGAL, 
PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR 
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However, we are unaware of any research suggesting that credit score is a 
useful predictor of risk in other lines of insurance. Indeed, insurers in these 
three lines of insurance have not historically used credit information in 
their underwriting practices. 1 13 Thus, there was never a need to restrict the 
usage of credit score in these lines.1 14 
Our model also explains why the regulation of credit score in 
property casualty and automobile insurance tends to hover around a strong 
limitation ("3") rather than a prohibition ("4") in our data. Our second 
prong, the illicit discrimination property, suggests that there is a rationale 
for strong regulation in this domain. The core justification for regulating 
credit score is that it is not causally linked to risk and instead serves as a 
proxy for socially suspect characteristics like race and income. At the same 
time, adverse selection, our third prong, at least mildly pushes against the 
outright prohibition of credit score. The result is a strong limitation with 
some states explicitly prohibiting this practice. 
5.  Cross-Line Treatment of Race, Religion, and Ethnicity 
Chart 3 above showed that race, ethnicity, and religion (the "big 
three") are the most intensely restricted characteristics in every line of 
insurance, with sometimes a full one-point difference between them and the 
DIE 83 ( 1 st ed. 2013) (quoting David Hanson of the National Association of 
Independent Insurers). 
1 13 See NAIC, CREDIT REPORTS AND INSURANCE UNDERWRITING (1997) ("As 
reported by the American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI) and the Health 
Insurance Association of America (HIAA), life and health insurers do not use 
credit reports of the type that are used to establish a person's eligibility for credit . .  
. "); Christopher Cruise, How Credit Score Affects Insurance Rates, BANK.RATE 
(Sept. 23, 2003 ), http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/insurance/ credit-scores I .asp 
("So far, spokesmen at the trade associations for health and life underwriters say 
they don't know of any of their members use credit scoring in under\vriting and 
pricing policies . . .  "). 
1 14 There is some anecdotal evidence that life, disability, and health insurers 
may be experimenting with using credit score to rate policyholders. If so, then this 
suggests that states should be cautious in restricting limitations on insurance 
discrimination to lines in which carriers presently use the characteristic at issue. 
Doing so can produce unjustified discrepancies in legal restrictions if insurers' 
underwriting or rating patterns change. 
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next most restricted characteristic, namely gender.1 15 Surprisingly, though, 
states do not uniformly prohibit insurers from using race, religion, and 
ethnicity, a fact we explore at length in related work. 1 16 For present 
purposes, the key issue is the variation in states' regulation of the "big 
three," which resembles the broader cross-line trends: property/casualty 
insurance is the most restrictive line of insurance, then auto, health, life and 
lastly disability insurance. 
Chart 8: Distribution of States' Scores for Race, by Insurance Line 
1 15 Interestingly, the prohibition on using religious affiliation is stricter on 
average than the prohibition on using race or ethnicity. See supra Chart 3.  
1 1 6  See Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, supra note 1 .  
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Chart 9: Distribution of States' Scores for Ethnicity, by Insurance Line 
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Chart 10: Distribution of States' Scores for Religion, by Insurance Line 
At least with respect to the big three, however, we think that the 
be�t explanation for this pattern is not the adverse selection property, which 
was _the principal explanation we offered for cross-line variation that was 
no trait specific. Instead, it is likely that the patterns found in each of the 
charts above are better explained by prong one of our model: the predictive 
property. There is substantial historical precedent for homeowner and 
automobile insurers using race, or proxies for race, ethnicity, and religion 
in their underwriting. 1 17 By contrast, there is much less historical precedent 
for race, ethnicity, or religion ever been used in health, life, or disability 
insurance, and it is not immediately clear that these factors would offer 
much predictive value to insurers even if they were to use them.1 18 
1 17 See, e.g., J. Gabriel McGlamery, Note, Raced Based Underwriting and the 
Death of Burial Insurance, 1 5  CONN. INS. L. J. 531 ,  538-39 (2009). 
1 1 8  The one exception was industrial life insurance, which amounts to a form 
of burial insurance. For years this insurance was classified according to race, 
which apparently was never considered illegal, but the practice died out some 
thirty years ago. Id. at 53 1 ,  538-39. 
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If at all, the question is why not every state in the country prohibits 
the use of race, ethnicity, and religion. In other words, why do some states 
just limit the use of race? In our previous article we offered a number of 
theories. Perhaps state regulators and their constituents are under the 
impression that federal law already bans the use of these characteristics. 
Or, maybe state legislatures that have not adopted bans for the big three are 
of the view that insurers have stopped using race, ethnicity, and religion 
already and thus that a law prohibiting their use would simply be 
unnecessary. 
We are still left with a puzzle though.: why do state insurance anti­
discrimination laws impose stiffer restrictions on the use by insurers of the 
"big three" in auto and property/casualty insurance than they do for health, 
life, and disability. As in the case of credit score above, we believe that 
adverse selection does not provide an adequate answer. Even if these 
characteristics have predictive value for health, life, or disability insurance, 
unlike the case of credit score, none of these lines actually permits taking 
these characteristics into account. We therefore believe that the best 
explanation is that these characteristics clearly fall under the general 
restrictions rules (coded as 1 ), which explains the low average score. 
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6. Cross-Line Treatment of Zip Code 
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Chart 11 :. Distribution of States' Scores for Zip Code, by Insurance Line 
States' regulation of discrimination on the basis of policyholder zip 
code varies along the same lines that generic antidiscrimination rules vary 
across lines: it is regulated most restrictively in property/casualty insurance 
and least restrictively in health and disability insurance. Chart 11 
demonstrates this fact, while revealing that state laws specifically 
mentioning zip code are much more common in auto, property/casualty, 
and health insurance than they are in life and disability insurance. Chart 1 1  
also shows that almost twenty states explicitly permit health insurers to 
classify policyholders' risks based on their zip code, compared with only 
five states which permit it in automobile insurance, and only one in 
property/casualty insurance. 
Once again, these results are consistent with our model. First, the 
fact that state law specifically mentions zip code much more frequently in 
health, property/casualty, and auto than in disability and life insurance is 
consistent with prong one of our model. Zip code has clear predictive 
value in the lines where states tend to regulate it. Thus, zip code is quite 
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relevant to health insurance risk, as there is substantial geographical 
variation in the general cost level of medical services in different 
geographic area.1 19 Zip code also has predictive value for property/casualty 
insurance because it can provide information about the risk of fire, the 
likelihood of theft, the cost of rebuilding, and numerous other factors that 
are constitutive of a homeowner's risk. 1w Similarly, zip code can help 
predict auto policyholders' risk because it provides information about 
traffic patterns, density, and risk of loss. 121 Indeed, the vast majority of 
states do not leave zip code unregulated in auto insurance. Therefore the 
first prong of our model is helpful in explaining the variation in zip code 
regulations. By contrast, it is unclear whether zip code has any capacity to 
predict risk for disability and life insurance (at least once other 
underwriting factors are used). 122 
As for the disparate treatment of zip code for health insurance, on 
the one hand, and automobile and property/casualty insurance on the other, 
this too is consistent with our model. The relatively strong restrictions on 
using zip code in automobile and homeowners insurance stems from the 
fact that commentators and consumer groups have argued that zip codes 
are, or in the past have been, used by insurers as proxies in the home and 
auto insurance context for socially suspect characteristics, such as race. 
Although the same concern might apply in the health insurance domain, 
adverse selection pushes in the opposite direction given the large 
geographical variation in the costs of health care. The magnitude of that 
variation makes adverse selection a much larger threat in health insurance 
than in home or auto insurance. 123 
1 19 Understanding of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Health Care 
System, DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ 
(last visited Nov. 2 1 ,  2014). 
120 The ISO (Insurance Services Office) evaluates public fire protection 
capabilities. See ISO 's Public Protection Classification (PCC) Program, ISO 
MITIGATION ONLINE, http://www. isomitigation.com/ppc/0000/ppcOOOl .html (last 
visited Nov. 2 1 ,  2014). 
121 David Lazarus, ZIP Code Still a Factor in Auto Insurance, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 6, 2008), http://www. latimes.com/business/custom/yourmoney/la-filazarus 
6apr06,0,693725.column?page=2. 
122 We note that mortality and disability rates should also depend on crime 
rates and accident rates, both of which depend on zip code. 
123 See supra Part II (discussing adverse selection). 
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7. Cross-Line Treatment of Sexual Orientation 
49 
As Chart 12  shows, the most restrictive line with respect to sexual 
orientation is health, followed by life insurance. By contrast, sexual 
orientation is less regulated in auto, property/casualty, and disability 
insurance, with many states having a no-law score with respect to sexual 
orientation. 
Chart 12: Distribution of States' Scores for Sexual Orientation, by 
Insurance Line 
Once again, these results are largely consistent with our model. 
First, it is quite clear that sexual orientation has currently no predictive 
power with respect to auto, prop/casualty, and disability. This explains 
why a number of states in these lines of insurance have no law on point 
(our first prong). By contrast, at several points in recent history sexual 
orientation was perceived to have predictive power with respect to 
healthcare costs and an increased mortality rate via its perceived 
association (whether empirically proven or not) with AIDS. This explains 
why all states in health and life insurance chose to regulate it. Second, 
sexual orientation has over the past decades become recognized as 
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deserving protection against discrimination, as discussed above. 124 Thus, 
there is a strong fairness based argument that sexual orientation should not 
be used in the lines where it does have perceived predictive power: life and 
health insurance. Third, the number of individuals who actually . are gay 
and have AIDS is quite small relative to the aggregate pool of 
policyholders. As a result, prohibiting discrimination on this basis 1s 
unlikely to cause any substantial amounts of adverse selection costs. 
V. CONCLUSION AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
Insurance regulations governing permissible forms of 
discrimination vary among states, characteristics, and lines of coverage. 
This Article demonstrates that a tremendous amount of this variation can be 
explained by a simple three-pronged model that emphasizes the predictive 
value of a characteristic in a particular line, the exte:Qt to which that 
characteristic is socially illicit, and the risk that limiting discrimination on 
the basis of that characteristic will result in adverse selection. 
Although this Article is primarily descriptive and empirical, it also 
may have important normative implications by helping to give meaning to 
a central, but largely under-developed and rarely employed, principle in 
insurance law. That principle - that insurers cannot engage in "unfair 
discrimination" - was a primary element of the modem origins of insurance 
regulation. 125 Yet specific applications of this prohibition, either by 
regulators or through the judicial system, have been sporadic and 
haphazard. This is ironic, in light of this Article's finding that state laws 
regulating discrimination in insurance reflect a relatively limited and 
consistent set of principles that can easily be extended to a wide range of 
different forms of discrimination. 
The existence of a consistent set of insurance anti-discrimination 
principles can, and should, empower courts and regulators to supplement 
specific statutory prohibitions with "unfair discrimination" in insurance 
where the implicit model suggests this would be appropriate. To 
understand why, it is important to appreciate that each of the elements of 
the general model we uncover can evolve quickly over time. For instance, 
insurers' methods for discriminating among policyholders are subject to 
constant innovation, which is driven by the profits that private insurers can 
derive from "skimming" good risks from their competitors. Obesity, for 
124 See supra Part IV.A (charting discrimination based on sexual orientation). 
125 Wortham, supra note 1 1 , at 385. 
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example, might become a new subject of insurance discrimination. 
Similarly, whether or not prohibitions against particular forms of 
discrimination will generate meaningful adverse selection depends on 
changing market dynamics, such as elasticity of demand and risk 
differentials among policyholders in a particular state. Finally, state norms 
regarding what constitutes illicit discrimination are themselves constantly 
evolving, though this type of change (standing along) may well be at a pace 
that legislative, rather than regulatory or judicial, responses would be 
appropriate. 
Given the potential for swift changes in each of the relevant 
elements of the basic components of the implicit model that seems to 
define the contours of state anti-discrimination law, state legislation will 
often be too slow to identify emerging forms of unfair discrimination. It is 
likely for this very reason that legislators enact both specific and more 
general laws governing anti-discrimination in insurance. At varying points 
in time, states prohibit specific forms of insurance discrimination, based on 
current insurer practices, insurance market realities, and social norms. 
Prohibitions against insurance discrimination on the basis of race or 
ethnicity are obvious examples. At the same time, states enact, or 
maintain, broad prohibitions against "unfair discrimination," which 
empower regulators and courts to be more responsive to changing insurer 
practices, market conditions, and social norms. Such statutes reflect, in 
other words, state legislature's  farsighted understanding that the relevant 
conditions for identifying "unfair discrimination" in insurance are 
constantly changing. 
This division of labor among the branches of government provides 
the conceptual connection between the principles (the three-prong model) 
that underlie state insurance anti-discrimination law and the framework that 
should guide commissioners and courts alike in applying prohibitions 
against "unfair discrimination." By interpreting prohibitions against 
"unfair discrimination" according to the three-prong model this Article 
describes, courts and regulators apply broad social understandings 
underlying insurance anti-discrimination norms to ever-changing practices, 
markets and norms. 
Consider one example of how this might work in practice. 
Recently, the Colorado Division of Insurance released a bulletin informing 
health insurers that discrimination against policyholders on the basis of 
sexual orientation violated state laws against unfair discrimi1_1ation. 126 This 
126 See Colo. Div. of lns. Bulletin, supra note 13 .  
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type of action is perfectly consistent with the larger model we uncover in 
this Article. First, the Department' s  action was triggered by information 
suggesting that certain health insurers were discriminating among 
policyholders on the basis of sexual orientation suggesting that in the eyes 
of these health insurers sexual orientation is a predictor of costs. Second, 
prohibiting such discrimination would be extremely unlikely to generate 
adverse selection, as differentials in health care usage among people with 
different sexual orientations are unlikely to be particularly large. Third, 
emerging norms in Colorado and elsewhere increasingly consider 
discrimination against individuals on the basis of sexual orientation to be 
illicit. Taken together, these factors suggest that Colorado's application of 
its prohibition against unfair discrimination to the specific case of 
discrimination against gay people in health insurance reflects broad social 
understandings of "unfair discrimination" in insurance. 
Ultimately, then, our model provides a consistent and workable 
framework for breathing life into the largely dormant prohibition against 
unfair discrimination. Not only that, but it suggests the need for doing 
precisely that, as the very features that help define unfair discrimination as 
a descriptive matter are capable of changing swiftly, thus necessitating a 
more nimble form of regulation than that which can be provided by the 
slow and difficult process of passing state legislation pertaining to specific 
forms of insurance discrimination. Finally, the model is itself grounded in 
implicitly shared understandings among the states regarding what types of 
discrimination are permissible in the insurance domain. 
